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Abstract: Malaysia’s previously hegemonic Barisan Nasional (BN) gov-
ernment was unexpectedly defeated in the 2018 general election despite a 
fragmented opposition and widespread three-corner fights that theory 
states should inhibit turnover. Why? We argue that the opposition-split 
hypothesis rests on three core assumptions: third parties split only the anti-
incumbent vote; coalition/party support is relatively uniform across the 
country; and opposition parties are not “elite splits” in disguise. The Ma-
laysian context challenges all three of these assumptions. Counterfactual 
election simulations ultimately suggest that the opposition split neither 
dramatically helped nor hurt the BN. While this does not upend conven-
tional wisdom on opposition coordination, it does demonstrate that the 
theory manifests only when its assumptions accord with local realities. 
More substantively, our analysis also provides insights into why the new 
opposition will likely seek to increase the salience of ethno-religious issues 
in a bid to recapture electoral ground.  
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Malaysia’s ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition entered the 2018 general 
election fully confident of extending its grip on power, as coalitions led by 
the hegemonic United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) had dom-
inated Malaysia’s politics since the country’s independence in 1957 by win-
ning each of the 13 previous general elections.1 The BN’s confidence was 
bolstered by the dissolution of the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) opposition coali-
tion, through which the ideologically dissimilar opposition parties had co-
ordinated efforts in the previous two elections. While a new coalition – 
Pakatan Harapan (PH) – was created in its place, it did not include the 
crucial Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). Instead, with tacit support 
from the BN, PAS contested the election independently as a third party. 
This created three-corner contests throughout Malaysia that both BN and 
most observers assumed would split the anti-incumbent vote, thereby 
helping to preserve the BN’s rule.  
This expectation was consistent with theoretical work on electoral 
authoritarian regimes, which contends that a fragmented opposition sig-
nificantly impedes efforts to unseat a hegemonic regime (Donno 2013; 
Magaloni 2006). Hence, such regimes may attempt to co-opt segments of 
the opposition in an effort to inhibit coordination and raise the threshold 
required to defeat them (Gandhi 2008; Gerschewski 2013). As Ong notes, 
the age-old strategy of dividing to rule is “one of the surest techniques of 
entrenching dominance” (2016: 186). We refer to this as the “opposition-
split hypothesis.” And yet, despite a newly fragmented opposition and 
other far-reaching advantages, the BN was forced to concede defeat, 
thereby bringing an end to one of the world’s longest-ruling elected re-
gimes. The result is even more confounding because the BN’s win in the 
2013 general election (GE13) came against a highly coordinated opposi-
tion. 
Does Malaysia’s fourteenth general election (GE14) challenge the 
conventional wisdom on opposition coordination in electoral authoritar-
ian regimes? This article examines the role of opposition coordination and 
three-corner fights in the BN’s unanticipated electoral defeat, as well as 
the implications of the turnover for future inter-party coordination in Ma-
laysian politics. Without question, some elements of the election follow 
theoretical expectations. As conventional wisdom assumes, UMNO likely 

1  The 11 states of the Malay Peninsula became independent as Malaya in 1957. 
Merger with the territories of Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore in 1963 created the 
Federation of Malaysia. Singapore left the federation in 1965, leaving the current 
13-state configuration.  
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facilitated – if not outright orchestrated – the fragmentation of PR and 
PAS’s subsequent decision to contest the election as a third party. PAS 
ultimately ran as a third party in 70 per cent of districts and captured 17 
per cent of the popular vote. While the prevailing expectation was that this 
would divide the anti-incumbent vote, the ratio of BN to PH votes in 
GE14 actually decreased in most districts relative to the ratio in GE13. How 
do we explain this counter-intuitive outcome? Theoretically, the opposi-
tion-split hypothesis rests on the assumption that third-party challengers 
take votes only from the established opposition party in a given district. We 
argue that the pronounced regionalism of Malaysia’s politics significantly 
mitigated the impact of opposition fragmentation, as the third party was a 
strong factor in only one of the four distinct electoral arenas. Moreover, 
the mutual focus on a conservative Islamist agenda and policy coordina-
tion left UMNO and PAS largely competing over the same pool of votes, 
making PAS a suboptimal agent for UMNO’s attempts to divide opposi-
tion votes. In short, it is likely that PAS took votes from UMNO as well 
as from PH.  
There are no available tests to determine with precision who third-
party voters would have supported in the absence of a third-party option. 
Consequently, we conduct a series of simulations that estimate the seat 
share of counterfactual elections without three-corner contests under a 
range of potential distributions. This exercise yields two conclusions. First, 
three-corner fights are almost certainly not responsible for the BN’s defeat, 
though it is conceivable that they hurt the BN more than they helped them. 
Second, if a significant share of PAS votes went to the BN – as they pre-
sumably would have under a more formal Malay-unity coalition – the BN 
would have secured a sufficient number of seats to retain power. While 
the dramatic reshuffling of Malaysia’s political landscape limits the utility 
of making projections, the existence of this pathway to power in GE14 is 
likely to inform strategic decisions within UMNO and PAS.  
The distribution of votes between the three main challengers in 
GE14 offers insights into the likely nature of post-transition politics in 
Malaysia. The BN already abandoned pretences of representing ethnic 
Chinese and Indian interests in the run-up to GE14, and PAS made clear 
its unwillingness to work together with any party that maintains ties to the 
largely Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP). As such, the clearest vi-
able strategy for both is to amplify the salience of ethno-religious fault 
lines in a bid to reclaim the Malay vote, which comprises over half of the 
electorate and supported the BN and PAS at significantly higher rates than 
PH in GE14. Even if the presence of Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Ber-
satu) – an UMNO-clone party created by an elite split within UMNO – in 
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the PH coalition mitigates the impact of this strategy, ethno-religious agi-
tation by UMNO and PAS will complicate the internal politics of the ex-
plicitly multiracial PH coalition. 
Our findings also contribute to the extensive literature on opposition 
coordination and fragmentation under electoral authoritarianism. Specifi-
cally, they underscore the importance of local context – especially local 
party structures – since the impact of opposition fragmentation was con-
strained by the heavily regionalised nature of party support in Malaysia, 
which limited PAS’s ability to draw votes from other opposition parties. 
They also question the generally unstated assumption of the coordination 
thesis, namely that the third party takes votes only from the other chal-
lenger and not the ruling party. As such, the popularity of the incumbent 
relative to its local opponents may matter more than the degree of coor-
dination between the opposition. Furthermore, we note the importance of 
intervening factors – for example the elite split within UMNO that led to 
the creation of Bersatu – which likewise mitigated the impact of opposi-
tion fragmentation. In short, while the BN’s historic loss in GE14 does 
not upend the conventional wisdom around opposition coordination, it 
does significantly refine it. 
 (OHFWRUDO$XWKRULWDULDQLVPDQG2SSRVLWLRQ
&RRUGLQDWLRQ
A large body of literature examines the conditions that lead to the “stun-
ning” losses of hegemonic regimes, including in Africa (van de Walle 2006), 
Eastern Europe (Bunce and Wolchik 2010), India (Ziegfeld and Tudor 
2017), and Mexico (Magaloni 2006). The explanations offered for these 
reversals include foreign influence (Donno 2013), miscalculation (Hun-
tington 1993), and opposition learning (Lindberg 2006). The most domi-
nant one, however, is opposition coordination (Howard and Roessler 
2006; van de Walle 2006; Donno 2013; Ziegfeld and Tudor 2017). As 
Bunce and Wolchik note: “The electoral factor that has received the most 
attention […] is the unity of the opposition” (2010: 50). The converse is 
also true: if opposition coalition-building increases the probability of op-
position success, the fragmentation of the opposition may serve to stabilise 
the regime (Magaloni 2006). 
Howard and Roessler (2006) lay out the simple logic underlying the 
importance of opposition coalitions. First and most obviously, a frag-
mented opposition divides votes – which in a majoritarian electoral system 
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bolsters the chances of the largest party. Second, coalitions prevent oppo-
sition parties from campaigning against each other and allow them to train 
their fire on the incumbent. Third, opposition coalitions may decrease re-
pression because the incumbent fears they might win and afterwards exact 
revenge. Finally, coordination may mobilise citizens to vote by increasing 
the perceived likelihood of an opposition victory. 
Cross-national evidence supports these views (Howard and Roessler 
2006; Donno 2013). However, in attempting to understand whether Ma-
laysia is different, it is important to note that the coalition argument rests 
on an unstated assumption, specifically that no member of the coalition 
could take away votes from the incumbent. Consider the following scenario 
with three parties, where one is the incumbent: The assumption of the 
opposition-split model is that the incumbent’s vote share is fixed, and that 
the two opposition parties compete over the remaining share at the district 
level. Therefore, by participating in a coalition – in which one of the op-
position parties agrees not to compete in a given district – the remaining 
opposition party captures the entire available opposition vote. The first 
two columns in Table 1 show these scenarios. In Scenario 1, the opposi-
tion coordinates and wins, while in Scenario 2 the opposition does not 
coordinate and splits the anti-incumbent vote. Consistent with the theory, 
the incumbent wins when the opposition does not coordinate, and loses 
when it does.  
What happens, however, if the assumption that the two opposition 
parties steal votes only from each other is relaxed? Scenario 3 assumes a 
partial split. In this case, the opposition does not coordinate and all three 
parties run in all districts. Opposition party B now receives 20 per cent in 
each district. However, instead of all third-party votes coming from op-
position party A, only 10 per cent of the district’s votes are taken from 
them and 10 per cent from the incumbent. Why might this happen? Im-
agine a district where a large number of voters only weakly prefer the in-
cumbent to the available opposition party, which perhaps represents a dif-
ferent ethnic group. The addition of a new opposition party may result in 
some weak incumbent supporters defecting to the new opposition option. 
Furthermore, only a small number of those that voted for opposition party 
A are tempted to vote for the new opposition. In a case like this, the party 
split does not help the incumbent.  
A final option relates to elite splits, which produce new challenger 
parties comprised of defectors from the hegemonic party (O’Donnell, 
Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Reuter and Gandhi 2010). Mexico’s PRI 
faced this problem when disgruntled losers in the fight for the presidential 
nomination would form independent challenger parties. This option might 
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produce Scenario 4, where some members of the incumbent join opposi-
tion party A.  
If we assume that all previous supporters of opposition party A con-
tinue to support that party, and 15 per cent of voters from the hegemonic 
party join them, opposition party A wins even when they do not coordi-
nate with opposition party B. In fact, even if all of opposition party B’s 
votes come from opposition party A, the 15 per cent swing from the in-
cumbent to opposition party A still allows the latter to win – even without 
a coalition. 
7DEOH+\SRWKHWLFDO(IIHFWRI7KUHH&RUQHU)LJKWVXQGHU'LIIHUHQW6FH
QDULRV
  Scenario 1 (Baseline) Scenario 2 (Opposition Split) 
  All votes for Party A/B transferred 
to remaining Opposition Party 
Opposition divided and all votes for 
Party A/B subtracted from Party A/B 
  Incum Opp A Opp B Incum Opp A Opp B 
District 1 48 52 48 32 20 
  (0) (-20) (+20) 
District 2 44 56 44 20 36 
  (0) (+20) (-20) 
District 3 48 52 48 32 20 
  (0) (-20) (+20) 
Seats 0 3 3 0 0 
Result AB Coalition Winner Incumbent Winner 
 
  Scenario 3 (Partial Split) Scenario 4 (Elite Split) 
  1/2 of votes for the third party come 
from incumbent, 1/2 from other op-
position 
Opposition divided and all votes for 
Party A/B subtracted from Party A/B, 
but Opposition A receives 15 percentage 
points from incumbent 
  Incum Opp A Opp B Incum Opp A Opp B 
District 1 38 42 20 33 47 20 
  (-10) (-10) (+20) (-15) (15-20=-5) (+20) 
District 2 34 20 46 29 35 36 
  (-10) (+20) (-10) (-15) (15+20=35) (-20) 
District 3 38 42 20 33 47 20 
  (-10) (-10) (+20) (-15) (15-20=-5) (+20) 
Seats 0 2 1 0 2 1 
Result Opposition A Winner Opposition A Winner 
 
1RWH 7KHQXPEHUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQGLVWULFWYRWHSHUFHQWDJHVEH
WZHHQWKHEDVHOLQHRSSRVLWLRQFRRUGLQDWLRQDQGWKHQHZRXWFRPH
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This suggests several possibilities for the effect of three-corner fights in 
Malaysia’s GE14. The first is the opposition-split hypothesis, where the three-
corner fight worked as anticipated and increased the BN’s seat share. The 
BN’s defeat, in this scenario, is a result of it simply not drawing enough 
votes to be competitive, despite benefiting from opposition fragmentation. 
The second is the partial-split hypothesis, where the three-corner fight split 
votes from the incumbent and the opposition; in this instance, the three-
corner fights may have hurt the BN under certain vote distributions. While 
not mutually exclusive to the first two, the elite-split hypothesis proffers that 
the creation of PH component party Bersatu from former UMNO elites 
mitigated the impact of three-corner fights. This is because some voters 
supported the coalition built around the “alternative” manifestation of 
UMNO, regardless of which parties were contesting in a given district. 
Finally, it is clear that the heavily regionalised nature of Malaysian politics 
also mitigated the effect of three-corner fights. Specifically, the opposition-
split hypothesis assumes that parties are able to draw support across all dis-
tricts. When support bases are strongly localised, however, votes will be 
split only among those parties that are locally competitive, regardless of 
coalition alignments. In the Malaysian case, this greatly limited the impact 
of third-party challenges in areas beyond their respective strongholds. 
 &RRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ2SSRVLWLRQ3DUWLHV
LQ0DOD\VLD
The effect of opposition coordination also depends heavily on the elec-
toral system. Malaysia uses a Westminster-style parliamentary system with 
first-past-the-post rules in single-member districts. It was a quintessential 
competitive authoritarian system under large stretches of BN rule (Levit-
sky and Way 2010), with the BN using its control of Malaysia’s powerful 
state to manipulate the electoral process in ways that reinforced its political 
dominance.2 These far-reaching advantages, buttressed by performance 
legitimacy from Malaysia’s strong developmental record, allowed the BN 
to consistently win elections.3 UMNO and its coalition partners, in fact, 
secured at least a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority in 10 of the first 
13 elections, and seemed at no point in serious danger of losing power. 
Yet while these elections did not meet widely accepted standards of fair-
ness – at least from the 1970s onwards – they were generally free to be 

2  See Gomez (2016), Slater (2012), and Ostwald (2017a) for discussions of how 
UMNO maintained electoral dominance.  
3  The UMNO-led coalition was known as the Alliance prior to 1973.  
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contested by opposition parties (Lim and Ong 2006). Indeed, Malaysia’s 
various opposition parties won seats in every general election and consist-
ently managed to capture state governments.4  
As the nature of opposition parties shapes and constrains coordina-
tion possibilities, we briefly review the major players. Opposition politics 
in Malaysia have received significant academic attention (Jesudason 1996; 
Ufen 2009; Dettman 2018; Ong 2018). For GE14, PAS played the role of 
third-party challenger. Founded in 1951 by a faction of Muslim clerics 
within UMNO, PAS initially focused on ethnonationalist rather than Is-
lamist objectives. It then briefly joined the BN in 1974 after the May 13th 
race riots of 1969, though friction with UMNO caused it to resume an 
oppositional role outside of the coalition in 1978 (Noor 2014). Internal 
conflict in the early 1980s saw the ulama faction of Muslim clerics seize 
control, shifting the orientation of the party towards a more explicitly Is-
lamist agenda.  
PAS draws support primarily from rural Malays, who are constitu-
tionally defined as Muslim.5 As such, its base has similar characteristics to 
that of UMNO. The contest over the vital rural Malay vote precipitated 
what has been somewhat problematically described as an “Islamisation 
race” between PAS and UMNO from the 1980s onwards (Liow 2004), in 
which both sides have fought to portray themselves as the true defenders 
of Islam. This has substantially amplified the position of Islam in Malay-
sian politics (Mohamed Nawab 2017). Despite conceiving of itself as a 
pan-Malaysian party with widespread networks throughout the peninsula, 
PAS’s historic strength has been concentrated in the north-eastern Malay-
dominant states of Kelantan and Terengganu, with some penetration into 
Kedah and Perak; this historic stronghold significantly impacted the effect 
of three-corner contests in GE14, as argued in the following section.  
The DAP was founded in 1966 as the Malaysian successor to the 
People’s Action Party of Singapore. It effectively captured the progressive, 
urban, and predominantly ethnic Chinese constituency that previously 
supported Malaya’s socialist and communist movements through the pro-
fessed objectives of establishing a democratic and socialist Malaysia free 
of religious or racial hierarchies. While efforts to cultivate a more multi-

4  Malaysia has a federal structure with power nominally distributed between fed-
eral, state, and local government tiers (Harding and Chin 2014). Decades of cen-
tralisation, however, have largely hollowed out the competences of subnational 
tiers, thereby increasingly concentrating power at the federal level (Loh 2010; 
Ostwald 2017b).  
5  See Moustafa (2018) for a discussion of the legal foundations of Islam in Malaysia.  
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ethnic visage have brought some success, the Chinese association never-
theless remains pronounced (Weiss 2015). It has had considerable success 
in building an urban base in Peninsular Malaysia, particularly as the grow-
ing centrality of Islam and Malay privilege in the BN’s agenda weakened 
the position of BN component parties Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA) and Gerakan, who likewise have a historical Chinese and urban 
association. Fundamental differences in ideological orientation between 
PAS and the DAP prevented serious collaboration prior to the late 1990s. 
As Liow writes: 
Such was the religious conviction behind PAS politics, [that] the 
Islamic party was on many occasions prepared to forgo potentially 
fruitful cooperation with secular opposition allies in order to main-
tain fidelity to its declared objectives. (2004: 196)  
In its fragmented state, the opposition could muster only symbolically im-
portant seat wins, but was unable to seriously challenge the BN for control 
of the state. This changed with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the 
subsequent leadership dispute within UMNO. Against the backdrop of 
economic turmoil, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s sacking of his 
popular deputy Anwar Ibrahim focused political discontent with the BN’s 
leadership and gave rise to the Reformasi movement. This brought together 
political movements and non-governmental organisations that previously 
had little contact, and led to mass protests of an unprecedented scale 
(Welsh 2004; Weiss 2006). Following Anwar’s arrest, his wife Wan Azizah 
formed and led the Parti Keadilan Nasional (PKN), which would later 
merge with the Parti Rakyat Malaysia to form Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). 
With the predominantly Malay PKN as anchor and bridge, the DAP and 
PAS united to form the Barisan Alternatif (BA) opposition coalition. The 
BA attacked the BN’s vulnerabilities on issues like institutional decay and 
abuse of power, while largely avoiding the potentially divisive issues of 
Islam and Bumiputera privilege that had hitherto inhibited opposition co-
ordination. While the coordination was too new to have a significant im-
pact on the 1999 election (GE10), its potential to focus anti-BN senti-
ments was evident.  
The post-election period saw the BN severely clamp down on the 
opposition’s operating space by prohibiting rallies, restricting several op-
position publications, and imprisoning key opposition leaders – notably 
Anwar, on a nine-year term for the dubious charge of sodomy. The med-
dling had its desired effect: with strains between PAS and the DAP in-
creasing and a fragmented PKR unable to bridge divisions, coordination 
in the run-up to GE11 was poor. Consequently, the BN rebounded with 
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one of its strongest electoral performances, catalysing the BA’s dissolution 
shortly thereafter. 
Anwar’s unexpected release in late 2004 revitalised the opposition 
and facilitated renewed coordination. Under his leadership the factional-
ism that hampered PKN and PKR was contained, and PAS and the DAP 
were brought back to the table. The informal PKR–PAS–DAP coalition, 
which coordinated campaign efforts and candidate selection to ensure 
competitive two-corner fights against the BN, managed an unprecedented 
electoral breakthrough in 2008 (GE12): for the first time since the vio-
lence-shrouded 1969 election, the BN was denied its customary two-thirds 
supermajority and was forced to concede 5 of the 13 state governments. 
Moreover, the BN failed to win the symbolically important popular vote 
in Peninsular Malaysia; its junior partners – MCA, MIC, and Gerakan – 
were all but decimated. While the BN retained power due to far-reaching 
manipulations of the electoral system, the era of its undisputed hegemony 
was over (Maznah 2008; Ufen 2008; Pepinsky 2009). Shortly after the elec-
tion, PKR, PAS, and the DAP formalised their coalition as the aforemen-
tioned PR. 
 &RRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ*(DQG*(
The momentum of GE12 sustained opposition coordination leading up 
to and during GE13, where PR managed another unprecedented break-
through by winning the popular vote by a 4 per cent margin. Severe mal-
apportionment, however, still left the opposition with a 20 per cent seat 
deficit (Wong 2018; Lee 2015; Ostwald 2013). The realisation that a turn-
over of power remained elusive even with a significant popular vote vic-
tory deflated opposition politics (Welsh 2013). Against this backdrop fa-
miliar tensions between PAS and the DAP reappeared and ultimately frag-
mented the coalition.  
Several factors contributed to the split. The death of PAS spiritual 
leader Nik Aziz in early 2015 removed a key bridging figure between PAS 
and its coalition partners. Shortly thereafter a factional split within PAS 
saw the conservative ulama wing secure control, sidelining the pro-PR pro-
gressives and professionals, who then left the party to form the Parti Ama-
nah Negara (Amanah). This was the final blow for PR, which was sum-
marily declared dead several days later.  
With PAS charting its own course, the remaining PR members, to-
gether with Amanah and Sabah-based Warisan, coalesced as the aforemen-
tioned PH in late 2015. The absence of PAS was widely seen as a weakness, 
however, as the progressive nature of PKR and Amanah were ill-suited to 
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allaying fears among conservative rural Malay voters that an opposition 
victory meant the erosion of Muslim and Malay primacy. In short, without 
PAS in the opposition coalition, the opposition lacked the guarantor of 
continuity necessary to pry rural Malay votes away from UMNO.  
UMNO, however, faced growing vulnerabilities of its own. Prime 
Minister Najib Razak made international headlines for his involvement in 
the massive 1MDB financial scandal, and faced criticisms for mismanage-
ment of key institutions like FELDA and the unpopular goods and ser-
vices tax (Faisal 2018). Challenges from within UMNO were met with 
purges of those whose loyalty Najib doubted, including deputy prime min-
ister Muhyiddin Yassin and Mahathir’s son Mukhriz Mahathir. After much 
build-up, the 91-year-old Mahathir himself announced a return to politics 
with the aim of deposing Najib – leading, as noted, to the late-2016 crea-
tion of Bersatu, which drew in many of the purged UMNO elite. By March 
2017 Bersatu was an official member of PH, with Mahathir taking the role 
of prime minister-designate.  
Bersatu’s addition to PH mitigated, we argue, the coalition’s vulnera-
bility among rural Malay voters. UMNO has long presented itself as the 
true defender of Islam and Malay primacy, while suggesting that an oppo-
sition government which contained the DAP would be hostile to those 
ends. Survey evidence suggests that such concerns resonated strongly with 
rural Malays, for whom communal interests remain a high priority 
(Merdeka 2010). PAS’s presence in PR provided an effective counter 
against this messaging, as its Islamist credentials were evident. With the 
addition of Bersatu, PH gained a party whose members had established 
their political careers within UMNO – often by attacking the progressive 
agenda that UMNO warned of in the run-up to GE14. In short, a govern-
ment led by a Malay-only party comprised of former UMNO members 
offered conservative Malay voters a sense of continuity and some assur-
ance that a turnover of power would not jeopardise their position in soci-
ety and politics. Seen in this light, the formation of Bersatu can be consid-
ered an elite split, which theory suggests undermines autocratic rule, and 
may thus provide a counterweight to the effect of opposition fragmenta-
tion. 
 8012DQG2SSRVLWLRQ)UDJPHQWDWLRQ
The opposition’s fragmentation and the subsequent decision by PAS to 
contest GE14 as a third party were not simply a return to a pre-Reformasi 
equilibrium. Rather, we argue, they reflect deliberate efforts by UMNO to 
weaken challenges against it by following textbook political science theory. 
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These efforts take the form of leveraging the historic tension between PAS 
and the DAP over the role of Islam in Malaysian politics in order to frag-
ment the PR coalition, as well as providing PAS with support to run as a 
third party in GE14 in areas beyond its base, under the assumption that 
PAS would divide the anti-BN vote.  
UMNO made consistent efforts to fragment coordination between 
PAS and the DAP throughout the period of their collaboration. Examples 
abound. Following GE12, UMNO suggested the possibility of a Malay-
unity state government in Selangor – thereby challenging the cohesion of 
the fledgling PR coalition. While several senior PAS figures appeared re-
ceptive to this arrangement, it was ultimately declined following strong 
objections by other members, notably, Nik Aziz (Malaysiakini 2008; The 
Star Online 2013a). In other instances, conservative figures within PAS – 
including Hasan Ali and Nasharudin Mat Isa – echoed UMNO talking 
points while criticising their party’s collaboration with the DAP (The Star 
Online 2011; Malaysiakini 2011). Following PAS’s loss of Kedah and failure 
to capture Terengganu, its ulama council chief Harun Taib praised UMNO 
for its success with Malay voters, while urging the party to reconsider its 
political cooperation with the DAP and PKR (The Star Online 2013b; Ma-
laysiakini 2013).  
The 2015 death of Nik Aziz not only removed a key bridging figure 
in the opposition coalition, but also opened the door to divisive policy 
initiatives that his moderate faction had effectively stifled previously. Just 
one month after his death, the PAS-controlled Kelantan state assembly 
amended the Shariah criminal code to pave the way for the implementa-
tion of Shariah law. This was passed together with unanimous support 
from UMNO lawmakers (The Straits Times 2015). Soon thereafter PAS 
president Hadi Awang served notice that he would table a private mem-
ber’s bill – known as Act 355 – in federal parliament, which sought to 
remove remaining obstacles to the implementation of the Shariah criminal 
code. This likewise required active support from the UMNO-controlled 
parliament, which recognised that the issue of Islamic law was a red line 
for many DAP members and supporters (The Malay Mail 2016). Najib and 
Hadi amplified the visibility of the issue by attending events together and 
voicing support for PAS–UMNO cooperation, with clear reference to Is-
lamic law. As the issue dominated headlines, the PAS–DAP partnership 
grew increasingly untenable. While no single factor can be isolated as the 
cause of PR’s breakup, the wedge of political Islam played a major role 
and was almost certainly fostered – if not outright orchestrated – by 
UMNO.  
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There are ample indications of coordination between PAS and 
UMNO in GE14, including several strong statements by respective party 
elites. Hadi, for example, expressed a desire to see PAS govern the states 
of Kedah, Kelantan, Perak, Selangor, and Terengganu, while leaving the 
rest for UMNO (Free Malaysia Today 2017). There are also compelling in-
dications that UMNO provided financial support for PAS to contest the 
election beyond its heartland, without which the costs of deposits and 
campaigning in 160 districts – remarkably, more than UMNO itself con-
tested – would likely have been prohibitive (Malaysiakini 2018a, 2018b). 
The Sarawak Report alleged that top PAS leaders had received millions in 
cash from UMNO to support their election bid. In a recording that ap-
peared to defend the practice, then PAS youth leader Nik Abduh spoke 
openly about UMNO support:  
During the Sarawak Election, [when PAS] people did cooperate 
with UMNO to defeat DAP. It was apparent that Tok Guru Nik 
Aziz took UMNO’s money, Tok Guru Haji Hadi took UMNO’s 
money, I took UMNO’s money, everyone took UMNO’s money. 
Among the reasons why we succeeded was with UMNO’s help. 
UMNO helped us to achieve victory. (Sarawak Report 2018) 
Alongside the potential financial support, there were also widespread alle-
gations of informal candidate-level coordination between PAS and 
UMNO in some PAS strongholds, as PAS appeared to field relatively 
weak federal-level candidates in exchange for UMNO running weaker 
candidates at the state level. UMNO also appeared to make several policy 
concessions favourable to PAS’s agenda (Malaysiakini 2018c). To be clear, 
relations between the parties remained adversarial at times and in certain 
places. There is little question, however, that UMNO worked with PAS to 
achieve mutually desirable ends, many of which entailed pulling votes away 
from PH parties. 
 (PSLULFDO$VVHVVPHQWRI7KUHH&RUQHU
&RQWHVWV
The previous sections demonstrate three points. First, the existing litera-
ture strongly suggests that opposition fragmentation bolsters the proba-
bility of incumbent victory. Second, the BN seemed aware of this and ac-
tively fomented divisions between PAS and its opposition partners. Third, 
it achieved its goal of splitting the opposition in GE14, creating three-
cornered fights that were expected to divide the anti-incumbent vote and 
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return the BN to power. Despite this successful manoeuvring, the BN was 
dealt a devastating defeat in GE14.  
Table 2 examines aggregated electoral results from GE13 and GE14, 
which provide three initial observations that help make sense of the out-
come. First, the BN suffered a major decline in vote share, lagging behind 
PH by nearly 15 per cent – relative to only 4 per cent in GE13. Second, 
PAS secured a substantial portion of votes as a third party in GE14, cap-
turing just over half of the BN’s vote totals. This is a remarkable result for 
what is a niche party next to the BN’s ostensibly grand coalition structure. 
Lastly, both PH and the BN received a seat share above their vote share 
in GE14. While PH’s seat bonus is expected due to the tendency of ma-
joritarian systems to produce manufactured majorities, the BN’s seat bo-
nus – despite the poor popular vote performance – suggests that electoral 
boundaries continued to play in its favour (Oliver and Ostwald 2018).  
7DEOH5HVXOWVRI*(DQG*(
Election Coalition Seats 
Con-
tested 
Seats 
Won 
Per 
Cent 
Seats 
Popular 
Vote 
GE14 Barisan Nasional 222 79 36% 34% 
  Pakatan Harapan 221 121 55% 49% 
  PAS 158 18 8% 17% 
GE13 Barisan Nasional 222 133 60% 47% 
  Pakatan Rakyat 222 89 40% 51% 
 
These aggregate outcomes, however, obscure substantial regional varia-
tion in coalition/party strengths and competition dynamics. To clarify the 
role of opposition fragmentation, we suggest conceiving of GE14 as four 
distinct regional contests. As previously discussed, if specific opposition 
parties are unable to secure substantial electoral support outside their 
strongholds, then the impact of three-corner fights may be mitigated.  
Table 3 displays the number of seats contested, seats won, proportion 
of seats won, and popular vote in each of the four regional arenas in GE14. 
The proportion of seats won in GE13 is also included for context. The 
first arena comprises the 57 districts of East Malaysia, which have a dis-
tinct political history and dynamic (Oh 2013; Chin 2014). These were long 
dominated by the BN, justifying the characterisation of Sabah and Sarawak 
as the BN’s “fixed deposit” states. The second comprises the 22 districts 
of the north-eastern states of Kelantan and Terengganu, which are almost 
exclusively Malay and have been home to a pronounced PAS presence 
from the late 1950s onwards. The third comprises the 59 peninsular seats 
where ethnic Chinese and Indians make up more than 40 per cent of the 
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electorate. While the BN has historically been competitive in these largely 
urban and semi-urban districts, they were all but conceded to the opposi-
tion when the BN shifted to a more explicitly Malay-centric platform fol-
lowing GE13. The fourth arena comprises the 84 remaining peninsular 
districts in which Malays make up at least 60 per cent of the electorate. 
These are UMNO’s historical strongholds, as reflected by the BN winning 
over 80 per cent of these districts in GE13.  
7DEOH)RXU(OHFWRUDO$UHQDVLQ0DOD\VLD
    GE14 GE13 
    Seats 
Con-
tested 
Seats 
Won 
Prop 
Won 
Vote 
Share 
Prop 
Seats 
Won 
1. East Malaysia BN 57 30 .53 .40 .86 
 - 57 seats PH/PR 56 24 .43 .45 .14 
 - 2.4M voters PAS 14 - - .01 
2. North East BN 22 7 .32 .39 .41 
 - 22 seats PH/PR 22 - - .11 .59 
 - 1.8M voters PAS 22 15 .68 .48 
3. Minority BN 59 3 .05 .23 .29 
 - 59 seats PH/PR 58 55 .95 .67 .71 
 - 5.2M voters PAS 40 - - .09 
4. Remainder BN 84 39 .46 .37 .81 
 - 84 seats PH/PR 84 42 .50 .41 .19 
 - 5.5M voters PAS 81 3 .04 .20 
 
1RWH 6HDWVUHIHUVWR0DOD\VLD¶VORZHUKRXVHDewan RakyatVHDWV
 
PAS’s relevance varies substantially across these arenas in GE14. It was a 
non-factor in East Malaysia, contesting only one-quarter of the seats and 
receiving just 1 per cent of the vote. In the north-eastern states, by contrast, 
PAS was dominant, winning over two-thirds of districts and denying PH 
any seats, thereby prompting discussions of a “green tsunami” in the Ma-
lay heartland (Saat 2018). For all intents and purposes, PH acted as the 
third-party challenger in this arena, but its anaemic vote share of just 11 
per cent limited its impact. While PAS contested 40 of the 59 districts 
where ethnic Chinese and Indian voters comprise over 40 per cent of the 
electorate, it did not capture a single seat and drew less than 10 per cent 
of the vote, again limiting its relevance. Only in the remaining Malay-dom-
inant seats of the peninsula was PAS potentially disruptive as a third-party 
contestant: while it won just 3 of these 84 seats, it secured 20 per cent of 
votes relative to 37 per cent for the BN and 41 per cent for PH. 
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Several conclusions are noteworthy. PAS was irrelevant as a third-
party contestant in East Malaysia and largely irrelevant in the ethnically 
mixed and minority-dominant peninsular districts. PH, by contrast, was 
too weak in the north-eastern states to meaningfully split the anti-BN vote, 
which undermined the aforementioned BN strategy of securing more fed-
eral seats in exchange for running weak candidates at the state level. In 
short, despite a large majority of districts being contested by three parties, 
the relative weakness of the third-party challenger in most districts limited 
the relevance of opposition fragmentation. Only in a subset of the Malay-
dominant peninsular seats did PAS capture enough of the vote to be a 
decisive factor in an otherwise competitive fight between the BN and PH.  
How did the three-corner fights affect the contest between the BN 
and PH in those districts? Under the opposition-split hypothesis, a second anti-
incumbent option would divide anti-incumbent votes, thereby lowering 
the BN’s district-level victory threshold. This would lead to an improve-
ment in the BN-to-Pakatan vote ratio. For the sake of illustration, imagine 
a district with 5 pro-incumbent and 5 anti-incumbent voters. The addition 
of a second anti-incumbent option might draw 2 of the anti-incumbent 
votes, increasing the BN’s vote ratio from 1:1 to 1.67:1, thereby securing 
it the district. By contrast, the partial-split hypothesis states that the third-
party vote may come from both sides or from the BN alone. If the 2 third-
party votes came from the BN and PH, the vote count would be 2/4/4 
respectively, retaining the 1:1 ratio between the BN and PH and not sub-
stantially affecting the outcome. If the 2 third-party votes, however, would 
have supported the BN in a two-cornered contest, the BN to PH vote 
ratio would decline to 0.6:1. 
Comparing the change in BN-to-Pakatan vote ratios in competitive 
districts between GE13 and GE14 provides initial insights into the effi-
cacy of the BN’s opposition fragmentation strategy. The logic is simple. 
The BN hoped to retain its core voters in competitive districts and – fol-
lowing the opposition-split hypothesis – fragment the anti-incumbent vote. 
This would result in a uniform improvement of BN-to-Pakatan vote ratios. 
Figure 1 illustrates the actual change in vote ratios in competitive districts, 
defined here as those decided by less than 10 per cent in GE13. Districts 
in which PAS secured a greater vote share than the PH party are excluded 
due to the unique political dynamics in PAS strongholds. East Malaysian 
districts are likewise excluded due to the general irrelevance of the third-
party challenger there. A positive value indicates an improvement in the 
BN-to-Pakatan (Rakyat/Harapan) ratio, while a negative value indicates a 
decline.  
 
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If the BN’s strategy of retaining pro-incumbent votes while splitting anti-
incumbent votes was successful, we would see a uniform improvement in 
the BN-to-Pakatan vote ratio between GE13 and GE14. Instead, its vote 
ratio declined in 39 of the 47 districts. Losing these competitive districts 
essentially sealed the BN’s fate in GE14.  
Two potential factors contribute to this outcome. First, voters who 
supported the BN in GE13 may have defected to PH in GE14. Given that 
a large majority of these 47 competitive districts are in Malay-dominant 
areas where UMNO is traditionally strong, the elite-split hypothesis – which 
states that UMNO voters might support PH due to the sense of relative 
continuity that Mahathir’s leadership provided – is a compelling explana-
tion. Second, it is possible that UMNO was mistaken in assuming that 
PAS would only split the anti-incumbent votes; indeed, some of the PAS 
votes in GE14 may have gone to the BN rather than PH in the absence 
of a third-party option.  
We can assume that both of these factors contributed to the decline 
in the BN’s vote ratio. There is no reliable method for systematically dis-
aggregating their relative influence using available data, and even survey 
data is subject to potentially distorting bias. It is not possible, in short, to 
state with certainty who a third-party voter would have supported if GE14 
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only had two-cornered contests. In lieu of that, we present several scenar-
ios in which the third-party votes are redistributed between competitors 
in a counterfactual GE14 with only two-corner fights. This allows us to esti-
mate the hypothetical seat shares under different assumptions, thereby 
clarifying the implications of opposition fragmentation.  
There are two broad scenarios. In the first, all districts are contested 
between the BN and PH, so votes for PAS and other third-parties are 
redistributed between the two dominant coalitions. As this exercise is nec-
essarily speculative, Table 4 shows the hypothetical seat distribution fol-
lowing a range of feasible distributions – specifically, 100 per cent, 75 per 
cent, 50 per cent, or 25 per cent of PAS votes going to PH, with the bal-
ance going to the BN. Under the opposition-split hypothesis – where all votes 
for PH and PAS are anti-incumbent votes that would have gone to PH in 
a two-corner fight – PH captures 189 seats, thus completely decimating 
the BN. Note that this is essentially a recreation of PR, in which all sincere 
PAS supporters vote against the BN. The other distributions reflect some 
portion of PAS votes going to BN in a two-corner fight. As it is unrealistic 
to imagine an outcome where all PAS votes would have gone to the BN – 
given that some portion of PAS votes were clearly anti-Najib and anti-
incumbent in nature – we do not show that outcome. It is noteworthy that 
the right end of the spectrum, in which most PAS voters would cast a 
ballot for the BN in a two-corner contest, approximates a Malay-unity-
type coalition.  
7DEOH&RXQWHUIDFWXDO6HDW6KDUHVEHWZHHQWKH7ZR'RPLQDQW&RDOL
WLRQV%DVHGRQ5HGLVWULEXWLRQRI3$69RWHVWRHLWKHU3+RU%1
Seats 100% PH 75% PH 50% PH 25% PH 
PH 189 153 124 107 
BN 33 69 98 115 
 
In the second broad scenario, the two-party contests are between the two 
strongest coalitions/party in each district; meaning between the BN and 
PAS in the north-eastern states, and between the BN and PH everywhere 
else. Table 5 shows the hypothetical seat shares when the third-party votes 
from GE14 are redistributed in this manner. As before we do not show 
the unrealistic outcome in which 100 per cent of third-party votes go to 
the BN, as we believe at least some portion of that vote was firmly anti-
incumbent.  
 
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%DVHGRQ5HGLVWULEXWLRQRI7KLUG3DUW\9RWHVWRWKH
/DUJHVW7ZR&RQWHVWDQWVLQ(DFK'LVWULFW
Seats 100% 
PH/PAS 
75% 
PH/PAS 
50% 
PH/PAS 
25% 
PH/PAS 
PH 168 146 123 107 
BN 33 60 84 102 
PAS 21 16 15 13 
 
These simulations provide several insights on GE14 and the potential na-
ture of Malaysian politics post-transition. First, they demonstrate that even 
if UMNO miscalculated and the three-corner contests hurt the BN more 
than it helped them – meaning a significant portion of votes that went to 
PAS would have gone to the BN in a two-corner contest – they were al-
most certainly not responsible for the BN’s defeat. The only scenario in 
which the BN could have retained power in GE14 is under a Malay-unity 
government that secured a large majority of the PAS votes. While this is a 
credible scenario – indeed, UMNO and PAS have continued to signal 
close cooperation in the election’s immediate aftermath – it is likely that 
Najib’s personal unpopularity and Mahathir’s strong resonance among 
Malays would have led many third-party voters to opt for a Mahathir-led 
government over one led by Najib, even if PAS and UMNO officially 
joined forces. In short, the partial-split hypothesis can confidently be elimi-
nated as the principal cause of the BN’s surprise defeat in GE14. By con-
trast, if UMNO’s supposition that most voters were either pro- or anti-
BN was true, then opposition fragmentation in fact saved the long-ruling 
coalition from an even more cataclysmic defeat.  
Survey findings from immediately after the election allude to another 
key issue. Approximately 95 per cent of Chinese and three-quarters of In-
dians supported PH. The Malay vote, by contrast, was split far more 
equally, with approximately 25–30 per cent voting for PH, 35–40 per cent 
for the BN, and 30–33 per cent for PAS (The Straits Times 2018). In short, 
aside from the regional limitations of third-party appeal, there was a pro-
nounced ethnic dimension as well: opposition fragmentation failed to di-
vide the non-Malay vote in any meaningful way, but may have in fact been 
too effective at dividing the Malay vote.  
The Malay dimension requires closer examination. PAS’s exit from 
Pakatan, the split of its more progressive faction to Amanah, and the col-
laboration with UMNO on policy matters left PAS with an agenda that 
aligned more closely to UMNO’s than to that of PH. Both agendas, in 
essence, courted the same Islamist-leaning, conservative Malay vote. It is 
likely that UMNO and PAS split this bloc, while PH pulled in Malay voters 
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that prioritised the economic issues which were the focus of its campaign. 
This underscores, perhaps, the fundamental flaw in the BN’s strategy of 
dividing the anti-incumbent vote: while the Malay vote was indeed pivotal 
for deciding the election, PAS was far from the ideal party to execute the 
opposition fragmentation strategy.  
 'LVFXVVLRQ
Dominant party regimes often attempt to fragment the opposition in or-
der to reduce the threats to their power: assuming pro-incumbent sup-
porters can be retained through party machinery and electoral manipula-
tions, anti-incumbent voters can be divided between multiple opposition 
parties, lowering the threshold required to secure districts in majoritarian 
systems like Malaysia’s. This did not play out in GE14. Frustrations with 
Najib’s leadership, together with the appeal of the “same but different” 
option that a Mahathir-led opposition offered to voters who previously 
formed UMNO’s base, led to widespread defections away from the BN. 
Simultaneously, PAS was an appealing third-party option for some whose 
Islamist orientation made them hesitant to support a coalition that con-
tained the DAP, but who were also turned off by Najib’s apparent abuse 
of power. Without that third-party option, some Islamist votes may have 
gone to the BN, suggesting that PAS was simply not the right party to 
execute UMNO’s strategy. Regardless, the pronounced regionalism of 
Malaysian politics mitigated the effect of three-corner fights, as it is diffi-
cult for a single party to draw votes across the highly dissimilar electoral 
arenas.  
What do these outcomes indicate for post-transition politics in Ma-
laysia? The BN already all but conceded the peninsular non-Malay vote in 
GE14. Simultaneously, securing just 70 per cent of the votes that went to 
PAS would have been enough to win the election. This reality is likely to 
inform UMNO’s choice between two basic paths forward: to pursue a 
more multi-ethnic and progressive agenda, or to double down on the Ma-
lay-first politics. With the former strategy, UMNO needs to beat the PH 
parties on an agenda that they have refined over the course of several elec-
tion cycles. With the latter, there is a conceivable path to the resumption 
of power that does not require UMNO to redefine itself. In addition, agi-
tating on ethno-religious issues challenges the stability of the new coalition, 
which has yet to reconcile fundamental differences over the role of Islam 
and Bumiputera privilege in the Malaysian state. There is a ready partner for 
this in PAS, for whom the conservative Islamist agenda promises ongoing 
relevance in historic strongholds; PAS’s anaemic performance outside its 
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heartland in GE14 underscores its lack of appeal in more diverse areas, 
particularly following the departure of its progressive and professional 
wing.  
The prospect of continued UMNO–PAS collaboration thus appears 
strong, despite its clear limitations and concerning normative implications. 
The Sungai Kandis by-election, held less than three months after GE14, 
is illustrative: PAS chose not field a candidate, thus allowing a two-cor-
nered flight between the PH and UMNO candidates. PAS then urged its 
supporters to back UMNO, claiming that PH threatened Malay rights and 
the primacy of Islam, adopting the script straight from UMNO’s narrative. 
In terms of the broader electoral authoritarian regime literature, these 
conclusions suggest that the turnover of dominant party rule in Malaysia 
does not upend conventional wisdom about the importance of opposition 
coordination. Indeed, our simulations show that with greater coordination, 
the outcome could have been even more lopsided. Rather, the case illus-
trates the importance of local context, as the pronounced regionalism of 
Malaysian politics mitigated the effect of the opposition split while PAS’s 
agenda was ill-suited to pull votes from the progressive PH coalition. The 
effects of three-corner contests were also undermined by another promi-
nent theory in the democratisation literature: an elite split within UMNO 
allowed the grandmaster of Malaysian politics, Mahathir Mohamad, to of-
fer assurances of continuity to the same Malay voters that PAS and 
UMNO courted, but in the form of a coalition that removed the deeply 
unpopular Najib Razak from power and offered a tantalising path forward. 
As such, Malaysia’s GE14 provides the literature with a unique manifesta-
tion of two dominant theories of democratisation – even if it does not 
rewrite either of them.  
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